Another Federal Suit Implicating Constitutionality Of Colorado Foreclosure Law Surfaces; Despite Dismissal Of Entirety Of Complaint, Judge Says Inartful Pleading Was Nevertheless Good Enough To Grant Pro Se Homeowner A 'Do-Over'

In Denver, Colorado, The Denver Post reports:

• A second federal lawsuit contesting the constitutionality of Colorado's foreclosure laws has emerged.
  
  Unlike the case of an Aurora woman who obtained an interim federal injunction against the foreclosure auction of her house, the other involves a federal judge who decided a Denver man's 14th Amendment guarantee of due process was in question.
  
  U.S. District Judge Philip Brimmer last week dismissed the entirety of John Mbaku's complaint against Bank of America that challenged the bank's right to foreclose on his condominium.
  
  However, Brimmer determined there was a constitutional issue, though Mbaku didn't bring it up specifically.
  
  Because Mbaku, a law-school graduate who doesn't practice law, is representing himself, the judge is given wider latitude to read between the lines of a complaint since plaintiffs might not be as sophisticated or well-versed in the complexities of law.(1)
  
  In the introduction to his lawsuit filed last year, Mbaku noted how Colorado law allows a bank or lender to foreclose without showing how it obtained ownership of the loan.
  
  More important, because loan ownership is determined by who has possession of the document — known as indorsement in blank — Mbaku said anyone could come by that right, even a thief.
  
  "Plaintiffs could illegally obtain or otherwise steal a promissory note ... from any bank ... and present themselves at a ... hearing and be deemed ... to be the proper party to foreclose," Mbaku wrote.
  
  Brimmer thought that was enough to keep the lawsuit alive.
  
  The state hearing Mbaku is challenging is called a Rule 120 for the civil procedure that governs it. Brimmer liberally read the complaint and decided Mbaku's introduction was enough to merit attention. And because Bank of America didn't address it in a motion to dismiss, Brimmer let it stand.
  
  The judge on Thursday advised Colorado Attorney General John Suthers that a state law was under constitutional review and that Suthers has 60 days to respond.

For the story, see Second federal suit challenging Colorado foreclosure law emerges.

(1) For a couple of the many Federal court rulings mandating that trial judges cut pro se litigants a considerable amount of slack when hearing their cases, see:

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), in which the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the rulings of two lower courts, the court stated:

• The only issue now before us is petitioner's contention that the District Court erred in dismissing his pro se complaint without allowing him to present evidence on his claims.
  
  Whatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal administration of prisons, allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45—46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (CA2 1944).
  
  Accordingly, although we intimate no view whatever on the merits of petitioner's allegations, we conclude that he is entitled to an opportunity to offer proof. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Platsky v. Central Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1991), in which a Federal Appeals Court ruled:

• Pro se plaintiffs are often unfamiliar with the formalities of pleading requirements. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court has instructed the district courts to construe pro se complaints liberally and to apply a more flexible standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint than they would in reviewing a pleading submitted by counsel. See e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 175-76, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam); see also Elliott v. Bronson, 872 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam). In order to justify the dismissal of a pro se complaint, it must be " 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 594 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
  
  In light of these principles, we think that the district court should not have dismissed Platsky's complaints without affording him leave to replead.

***

• The district court also dismissed the complaints for their failure to plead facts that were sufficiently specific. The district judge held that Platsky failed to allege the concrete and particularized injury required to establish standing and to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

***

• We think that Platsky should have a chance to state his claim more clearly. It is not "'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim[s],' " Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 595, and therefore we hold that the better course would have been for the district court, in dismissing Platsky's pro se complaints, to grant him leave to file amended pleadings. See Elliott v. Bronson, 872 F.2d at 22. We have instructed Platsky that his complaint must set out, with particularity and specificity, the actual harms he suffered as a result of the defendants' clearly defined acts.
  
  Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and order below, and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow the plaintiff to replead.

See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which supports the mandate that trial judges cut pro se homeowners slack when bringing their cases:

• The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed. As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "`beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 -46 (1957). [429 U.S. 97, 107]